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MANAGEMENT CONTROL AND
VALUE-BASED MANAGEMENT:
COMPATIBLE OR NOT?
Paul C. M. Claes
ABSTRACT
This paper elaborates on the effects of Value-based Management (VBM)
on the Management Control System in three Dutch (multinational)
organizations.
The cases show that communication about the rationale of VBM and
how it affects activities and decisions are more relevant for acceptance,
than a metric-approach in which the calculations are explained into detail.
In that view, other tools are used, such as Balanced Scorecards, value
trees, or Activity-based Costing, while involving all functions throughout
the entire organization, such as strategy, human resources, and production.
What seems to be most important is that target setting, remuneration
and rewarding are aligned with the value drivers, holding people account-
able for the activities they control.
1. INTRODUCTION
Lots of literature about Value-based Management (VBM) has been pub-
lished in the last decade. Much of this relates to VBM-metrics and its
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assumed correlation with share price, as contributing to Shareholder
Value Creation (e.g., Stewart, 1991; Biddle, Bowen, & Wallace, 1997, 1999).
Other substantial research has been devoted to implementation of VBM and
its effects on the corporate level (Armitage & Jog, 1999; Wallace, 1997;
Haspeslagh, Boulos, & Noda, 2001). A third stream that can be distin-
guished is about the assumed conﬂict between the shareholder and stake-
holder view on the ﬁrm (Jensen, 2001; Wallace, 2003).
However, only little research has been conducted on how the organization
is affected with the implementation of VBM (Malmi & Ika¨heimo, 2003).
Especially, how VBM is implemented at lower hierarchical levels and how it
speciﬁcally affects the management Control System, seems to be an unex-
plored ﬁeld (Young & Selto, 1991; Langﬁeld-Smith, 1997; Ittner & Larcker,
2001; Marginson, 2002). This paper will therefore elaborate on these issues,
by means of describing the adoption and implementation of VBM in three
Dutch organizations and how it affected their existing Management Con-
trol Systems. For these three organizations, the following issues will be
addressed:
1. Why did the organization implement VBM?
2. How was VBM implemented?
3. How did VBM affect management control?
4. What were the effects of managing for value?
First it is necessary to have a clear description of what VBM is, and what
deﬁnition will be used when talking about VBM in this paper. Rappaport
(1986), Stewart (1991), McTaggert, Kontes, and Mankins (1994), We-
issenrieder (1997), Arnold (1998), Copeland, Koller, and Murrin (2000), and
Young and O’Byrne (2001), among many others, provide descriptions and
deﬁnitions of VBM. When looking at these, four important aspects relating
to VBM can be distilled:
 The ﬁrst aspect of VBM, and basically the distinguishing characteristic
of VBM compared to traditional performance management, is the cost of
capital. Where net proﬁts only include the cost of debt (interest), value is
created when both costs for debt as well as for equity are covered.
 Second, the purpose is to create economic value (rather than maximizing
accounting proﬁts), based on the notion of residual income, which states
that wealth is created only when a company covers all operating costs and
the cost of capital (Hicks, 1946).
 Third, VBM is a managerial approach, meaning that applying VBM is not
restricted to calculating the created value. It is an approach where many
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techniques, concepts, and tools are used to meet the ﬁrm’s objectives,
relating to all organizational functional areas (e.g., production, logistics,
strategy, ﬁnance, accounting, and human resources) and levels.
 Fourth, the VBM system is built around value drivers. This stresses the
fact again that it is not about the calculation (e.g., Haspeslagh et al.,
2001), but about the activities that are related to the variables of the
calculation. These activities can be expressed in both ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial terms, and involve all organizational levels. Ways to operation-
alize this ‘break-down’ is by using for example the Balanced Scorecard or
a ‘value tree.’1
Based on these aspects, I will deﬁne VBM as:
Value-based Management is a managerial approach to manage a company by focusing
on the key value drivers in order to create value by investing in projects exceeding the
cost of capital.
Regarding management control, I will use Anthony and Govindarajan’s
(2001) deﬁnition, as this deﬁnition best follows the aspects to consider as
mentioned above regarding VBM. They describe the activities that are in-
volved with management control as follows (Anthony & Govindarajan,
2001, pp. 6–7): (1) planning what the organization should do, (2) coordi-
nating the activities of several parts of the organization, (3) communicating
information, (4) evaluating information, (5) deciding what, if any, action
should be taken, and (6) inﬂuencing people to change their behavior. More-
over, they state that ‘management controls are only one of the tools man-
agers use in implementing desired strategies,’ besides organization structure,
human resources management, and culture (p. 8). This leads to Anthony
and Govindarajan’s deﬁnition of management control: ‘the process by
which managers inﬂuence other members of the organization to implement
the organization’s strategies’ (Anthony & Govindarajan, 2004, p. 7). This
deﬁnition emphasizes that Management Control is largely about inﬂuencing
behavior, which is exactly what needs to be focused on upon implementing
VBM (e.g., Haspeslagh et al., 2001; Wallace, 1997).
In order to obtain the necessary information for the three case studies, I
interviewed corporate executives who were involved with the introduction
and implementation of VBM from a corporate perspective, and in addition
lower-level executives, whose activities should have been affected as a result
of managing for value. This way, a comprehensive picture was obtained
of the purposes and effects when ﬁrms decided to apply VBM, in order to
learn how VBM was implemented to lower hierarchical levels and how it
speciﬁcally affected the Management Control Systems.
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This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I will introduce the
three case companies, followed by the reasons why they implemented VBM.
In the subsequent sections, I will respectively focus on the implementa-
tion, management control systems, and the effects of managing for value on
behavior, decision making and performance, by comparing the three or-
ganizations. The paper ends with conclusions and directions for future
research.
2. INTRODUCTION TO CASE COMPANIES
This section introduces the three organization that are subject of this study.
2.1. Akzo Nobel N.V. (from now on: Akzo Nobel)
Akzo Nobel is a diversiﬁed multicultural group of companies with activities
in pharmaceuticals, coatings, and chemicals. They develop a competitive
advantage by combining the focus and entrepreneurial spirit of a decen-
tralized business unit organization with the scale and power of a corporate
center that provides access to global capital markets, managerial talent, and
best practice management processes. In 2004, total net sales amounted EUR
12.7 billion. The three groups contributed to the realization of these sales
as follows: Pharma 25%, Coatings 41%, Chemicals 34%.
In 1993 the organizational structure of Akzo Nobel was changed, result-
ing in new corporate staff departments and the adaptation of the employee
participation structure in the Netherlands. Former division ofﬁces and cor-
porate ofﬁces were integrated in order to effect a higher level of decentrali-
zation. At that point, the two-layer organization model turned more visible.
Applying this structure effectively, Akzo Nobel’s widespread activities were
attributed to business units that report directly to the Board of Manage-
ment. The business units had such delegated authorities that they could
adequately and quickly respond to market developments. In turn, the busi-
ness units were clustered into so-called Groups (i.e., Chemicals, Coatings,
and Pharma). The General Managers were responsible for the performance
of their business units. To safeguard consistency and coherence for the total
organization, corporate directives had been established by the board of
management. At the corporate level, certain functions were centralized in
order to execute a coherent policy, e.g., regarding administration and con-
trol, ﬁnance, human resources, legal affairs, strategy and technology.
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In the 1999 annual report, Akzo Nobel made its value-driven manage-
ment explicit for the ﬁrst time (p. 21):
Our ambition in the year 2000 is to make a further shift to value creation as the driving
force for our businesses.
2.2. Heijmans N.V. (from now on: Heijmans)
Heijmans is a leading Dutch construction and property development com-
pany. Aspiring to operate as a full-service construction and property develo-
pment company, Heijmans focuses on all of the activities in the value chain,
from consultancy services and design to maintenance and management. By
2008, Heijmans aims to realize approximately 35% of its income from opera-
tions concerned with the preliminary stages (consultancy services, design and
development), approximately 45% in the construction phase and approxi-
mately 20% in the follow-up phase (service, maintenance and management).
In 1972, the company changed its legal structure from a public company
into a holding company with operating companies, which were part of
product/market-based divisions. Upon this reorganization, all ﬁxed assets
were centralized in a Central Facility Company. When needed, the operating
companies could rent the necessary equipment and machinery. This way,
operating companies effectively had no capital, besides occasionally buildings.
In September 1993 Heijmans entered the capital market when their shares
were listed on the Amsterdam Exchanges (Midkap funds). The listing was
necessary to raise funds for ﬁnancing acquisitions, and maintaining a sound
solvency in order to secure independency (avoiding a hostile takeover or
strict supervision by banks).
On January 1st, 1995, Joop Janssen took ofﬁce as Chairman of the Board
of Management. In the 1996 Annual Report he mentioned in the paragraph
on risks and risk control, that (p. 14):
growth should again be accompanied with an increase in proﬁtability per share and an
increase in the economic value added. That way, the objective of increasing the value of
the company for the shareholders can be achieved.
2.3. Schiphol Group N.V. (from now on: Schiphol)
Schiphol is an airport operator. The company’s mission is to create sus-
tainable value for its stakeholders by creating and developing AirportCities2
and by positioning Amsterdam Airport Schiphol as the leading AirportCity.
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Since 1958 Schiphol is a privately owned company, although shares are
distributed among the Dutch state (75.8%), the municipality of Amsterdam
(21.8%), and the municipality of Rotterdam (2.4%). Over half of Schiphol’s
turnover (EUR 888 million over 2004) is derived from airport fees. Other
revenues are generated by concessions, parking fees and real estate as well as
participating interests. These sources of revenue are based on the company’s
four Business Areas of Aviation, Consumers, Real Estate and Alliances and
Participations.
In 1997 Schiphol set out new corporate objectives. Core of this new,
market-based strategy was to develop Schiphol into a customer-focused and
innovating airport, where various means of transportation come together
and which is attractive for transfers. For that reason, responsibilities and
authority were decentralized to business units.
At that time, Schiphol also explicitly articulated that privatization would
be most desirable in order to achieve their new organizational objectives.
They felt, as stated in the 1997 annual report, that ‘privatization allows us
opportunities to operate in a different way ﬁnancially’ (p. 11). A smaller
state’s stake would give the organization better access to capital markets to
raise funds for future activities. Besides, opportunities would arise for al-
liances and participations by means of exchanging shares. Therefore,
Schiphol started an Investor Relations program as of 1998 to strengthen the
ties with their ﬁnancial stakeholders and potential investors.3
After the new structure went into effect as of January 1, 1998, the newly
appointed CFO and corporate controller both wanted the ﬁnancial man-
agement of the business units to show what was effectively earned in eco-
nomic terms.
3. REASONS FOR IMPLEMENTING
VALUE-BASED MANAGEMENT
After the brief introductions to the companies in the previous section, I now
continue with the reasons why these organizations implemented VBM. In
analyzing these reasons, a distinction will be made between external and
internal reasons.
3.1. External Reasons
From an external point of view, capital markets had an important stake in
deciding to manage for value. As a result of increased pressure, mainly due
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to acquisitions, Akzo Nobel and Heijmans realized they needed to obtain a
sharper focus on capital use. Akzo Nobel described this as follows in their
2000 annual report (p. 6):
We measure value creation today in terms of Economic Value Added (EVA), a concept
we are currently introducing throughout the Company. It should improve capital pro-
ductivity, have a positive effect on shareholder value, and better reﬂect today’s thinking
on value creation.
Heijmans’ Finance Director told in this respect: ‘An important part of in-
vested capital is working capital. Reduction of working capital has a
number of positive advantages, among others, lower costs of capital. A
strong focus on EVA will be necessary in order to securely stay in the
drivers’ seat, rather than the banks taking over control.’
One of the main reasons for Heijmans to adopt VBM was for commu-
nication toward the stock exchange. The corporate executives interviewed,
though, were aware of the fact that the link between EVA and share price is
questioned. Heijmans had been renowned for its external communication,
ever since its initial listing on the Dutch Stock Exchange (in 1993).4 How-
ever, the listing introduced the capital market as a serious stakeholder in the
company. The 1997 annual report, covering the year in which VBM was
implemented, stated in that respect (p. 13):
Recent discussions, among others resulting from the investigation of the commission
corporate governance, focus the attention of Dutch companies mainly towards capital
providers. Starting point in that view is that managing for shareholder value will guar-
antee that in the long run, besides shareholders, also other stakeholders will maximize
their value.
The impact of the capital market on Schiphol’s decision to implement VBM
related to the potential initial public offering. Since Schiphol reasoned that
the capital market also required a rate of return on the money the share-
holders put in the organization, according to management VBM was a
logical consequence. Consequent stakeholders to a privatization, such as
investment banking analysts, were in management’s opinion increasingly
interested in how value is created. Schiphol’s management perceived to have
an adequate answer to value-related questions in VBM.
A more speciﬁc external reason for implementing VBM at Schiphol was
based on the pricing mechanism for airport tariffs that exists as imposed
by the government and the Dutch Competition Authority (Nederlandse
Mededingingsautoriteit – NMa). This mechanism implies that Schiphol
needs to discuss their tariffs with the government and the NMa, who allow
Schiphol to make a certain rate of return on their aviation-activities, which
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is included in the Dutch Aviation Act (‘Luchtvaartwet’). The NMa requires
therefore that the accounting systems are able to identify Aviation activities
and transactions. A former corporate controller states that ‘VBM is a nece-
ssary tool to confront the authorities, NMa, and airlines, in order to defend
proposed tariffs.’
Regarding the stock market, Akzo Nobel noticed that their share price
lagged the market index. This was a sign that the ﬁrm might become a target
for a (hostile) takeover, fueling the urge to keep a closer eye on corporate
performance. From that perspective, a sub-business unit controller was of
the opinion that the most important reason to implement EVA was to link
Capital with the Proﬁt & Loss account. As he stated, ‘EVA is a logical link
between these two blocks, therefore making it easier to explain why there
was such pressure on working capital and investments.’
3.2. Internal Reasons
This last external reason links to the reasons of implementing VBM from an
internal perspective. By means of VBM, Akzo Nobel encouraged entrepre-
neurial behavior, since all business units have a very high level of autonomy.
Managing for value was, according to Akzo Nobel, a solid push in the back
to accomplish a change of mindset among management and employees to
behave like owners, and manage the company at the lowest possible costs,
including the cost of capital.
This thought was reinstated by Heijmans, who pursued to create aware-
ness for working capital, more speciﬁcally accounts receivable, inventory,
and accounts payable. Since Heijmans emphasized working capital when
talking about VBM, it was often referred to as ‘working capital manage-
ment’ rather than EVA.
Schiphol’s activities require high investments, resulting in questions of
how much returns these investments actually yield. VBM provided the re-
quired insight into the true proﬁtability of investments, given the fact it
takes considerations into account that the traditional investment analyses
did not, while having a signiﬁcant impact on these investments, such as asset
allocations and its methods and the capital charge.
Besides, Schiphol felt the desire for implementing one single management
system that would align external and internal reporting and control, instead
of having different systems providing different information. This way,
everybody who contributed to VBM and was held accountable for (parts of)
it could see that a consistent system was used with one single ‘database’
feeding the reporting and performance management system. The Oracle
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system that replaced SAP in 1997 provided the necessary data warehousing
function, while the new information architecture allowed reporting on
different dimensions.
In order to meet the NMa’s requirement to explicitly distinguish aviation
activities (costs) from the other activities, the 2000 annual report described a
new organizational structure as follows (p. 19):
Schiphol Group’s strategy is increasingly directed at commercial services for end-
consumers.
To manage such diversiﬁcation, Schiphol Group uses a matrix structure with operational
business units and a division into product-market combinations (PMCs). These PMCs
are categorized according to four Business areas: Aviation, Consumers, Real Estate and
Alliances & Participations. In 2000, the necessary basis was established to bring the
accountability structure in line with the adapted business model.
Appendix 1 summarizes the reasons for implementation.
4. IMPLEMENTATION OF VALUE-BASED
MANAGEMENT
This section describes the key characteristics in the implementation of VBM.
Table 1 ﬁrst provides a brief overview of the metrics the organizations
applied when implementing VBM in expressing economic value creation.
4.1. Akzo Nobel
Regarding implementation, Akzo Nobel put in considerable time and effort
to train management, who were subsequently responsible for implementing
VBM in their unit. After initially given complete own responsibility, it soon
became apparent that such freedom did not contribute to a successful im-
plementation. In order to have more effective communication throughout
the company and have one ofﬁce for all EVA matters to help and support
the business units, the position of ‘EVA coordinator’ was introduced in
2001. This EVA coordinator, among other things, set up an intranet site
where all employees can post questions or look for information, developed a
‘drivers game’ to gain insight into the effects of different kinds of decisions
on EVA, organized ‘value seminars’ where people from different business
units meet and hear and discuss about issues relating to EVA, and drew up a
brochure for all employees in plain, non-technical, language.
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From the start in 2001, Akzo Nobel linked remuneration incentives with
value creation, initially for higher management. As of 2003, the EVA per-
formance was linked to the bonuses of all Dutch employees, while the impact
of the bonus ranged in percentage with respect to the hierarchical level. This
variable percentage related only to executives, and increased with the level of
executive (links to area of responsibility, or function). The widespread link
ensured a change in mindset to use capital efﬁciently among all employees,
instead of restricting this understanding only to higher managerial levels.
Since the new incentive plan involved all employees, unions were informed
about the system and agreed to its implementation.
4.2. Heijmans
Heijmans also contributed considerable time and effort in implementing
VBM. In training programs, VBM was included in the Finance part of such
Table 1. VBM Metrics.
Akzo Nobel Heijmans Schiphol
As of year 2000 1997 1999
Metric EVA EVA Return on Net
Assets/Economic
Proﬁt
Adjustments  Taxes
 Major Investment
Reliefa
 Exceptionals
 Off-balance sheet
items
 Cash
 Pensions
 Goodwill
 Taxes
 Leasing
None
Differences in EVA
deﬁnitions exist
between divisions.
Cost of capital One corporate
WACC
Initially WACC per
division; per 2002
one corporate
WACC
Initially WACC per
business area; per
2002 one corporate
WACC; as of 2005
WACC per
business area for
internal purposes
aThe Major Investment Relief (MIR) is introduced to avoid rejection of capital-intensive
investments, that in the ﬁrst years yield negative EVAs, and as a consequence would discourage
managers to invest in such projects. With the MIR, the negative EVAs of maximally the ﬁrst
three years are capitalized into the future. Hence, managers are basically ‘exempted’ from the
ﬁrst three years of negative EVAs in their performance.
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programs as last module. That way, it was shown that VBM was an all-
encompassing instrument that involved all other disciplines, like human
resources, strategy, and marketing. Or, as a division executive tells: ‘Even-
tually, all the pieces of the program ﬁt together in EVA.’
Similar to the early implementation of EVA at Akzo Nobel, no effective
communication between business units existed. For instance, one of the
divisions developed a value tree. The division executive said: ‘This is a sheet
that is shown at courses and which is understandable, compared to talking
about Stern Stewart’s 160 possible adjustments. Discussions should not
be centered around the calculations, but around the concepts. That way,
employees know that they need to create value, rather than have to pay
investors. With a value tree, this awareness is immediately born.’
However, a problem that Heijmans experienced, was that different deﬁ-
nitions were used between corporate EVA reporting (like in the annual
report) and the divisions. Reason behind these differences were that the
divisions were of the opinion that the ‘standard’ (corporate) EVA model
required some adjustments in order to be better applicable given the divi-
sion’s speciﬁc circumstances in which it operates. According to all executives
interviewed, though, it should be both possible and desirable to have a
uniform system.
Nevertheless, EVA never really gained foothold at lower levels in the
organization since no consequences were linked to EVA-performances (nei-
ther in ﬁnancial nor non-ﬁnancial gains, such as bonuses or promotions).
4.3. Schiphol
Main point when implementing VBM at Schiphol was to stress that it not
only provided shareholder value creation, but also took notice of other
aspects, as included in the so-called Diamond (to be discussed in the next
section, about control). In the early years, VBM was extensively used in the
areas of investment decisions as well as operational management. However,
as a result of the mandatory restructuring due to the NMa’s requirement of
distinction in costs for aviation activities and others, the organizational
responsibilities became rather complex and attention for VBM deteriorated.
The organization was restructured to administrative business areas and
physical business units, compared to only having business units before.
A business unit controller told: ‘This construction is more aimed at making
the calculations, rather than control the organization.’ Schiphol’s managing
board made this distinction even more profound: the Chief Financial Ofﬁcer
(CFO) was more focused on (the administrative) Business Areas, which need
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to create value, while the Chief Operating Ofﬁcer (COO) was more aimed at
(the physical) Business Units for organizational planning and control.
However, by 2003–2004 VBM regained attention. One of the reasons for
this ‘resurrection’ was that Schiphol was redesigning its business processes to
bridge the gap between business areas and business units. This enabled man-
agement (at all levels) to catch the concepts or refurbish its understanding of
VBM by means of a new training schedule aimed at explaining the thoughts
behind the system and the eventual effects on economic value when acting
alike. That way, a former corporate controller claimed, business processes
throughout the organization would be better aligned, while it also improved
internalization of VBM in the mindsets of people and procedures to be fol-
lowed. Or, as the former corporate controller put it: ‘If you want people being
held accountable for RONA, you should also manage on RONA, hence
see to it that everybody understands the system to improve that measure.’
The highest management levels (Managing Board and Business Unit
management) had targets deﬁned in VBM terms, whereas other perform-
ance criteria differed between individuals (such as customer satisfaction and
improving the purchasing procedure).
Appendix 2 summarizes the key characteristics of the implementation at
the three organizations.
5. VALUE-BASED MANAGEMENT AND
THE MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM
This section describes the characteristics of the management control systems
of the companies when managing for value.
5.1. Akzo Nobel
Akzo Nobel is aware of the fact that EVA is a historical measure, and for
that reason managing is based on the change in EVA rather than absolute
EVAs. Although the Corporate center is informed monthly about the busi-
ness units’ performances, formal presentations of results take place once
every quarter. These are based on EVA and grounded on the performance
of the last quarter, and the expected performance for the next three quarters.
Next to EVA, the presentations contain other ratios, since these can be
more or less considered as value drivers, as suggested by the EVA co-
ordinator. In the last quarter of each year, a three-year strategic plan needs
to be submitted.
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On sub-business unit level, application of traditional budgets are common
practice. Starting point in these budgeting processes is not that the EVA
must improve and subsequently plans are made to realize that, but that BU
management has a plan in mind, and the impact on EVA is considered.
Therefore, sales and proﬁts are starting point, in a bottom-up process within
the organization.
Since EVA targets are determined top-down, from a corporate target,
down to group target, and subsequently to business unit target, the sub-
business units budgets do need to be aligned with the BU’s EVA target.
Despite the tight corporate ﬁnancial control, business units have their own
responsibility to develop strategies in meeting their targets, as outlined in the
three-year strategic plan.
In realizing working capital reduction, Akzo Nobel started using ‘consign-
ment stocks’ around 2003. These are inventory that are physically present at
Akzo Nobel’s production sites, although they are still the supplier’s posses-
sion. Although no part of Akzo Nobel’s working capital, they are at their
direct disposal. This system is used in the Netherlands and Italy, and will be
introduced in Spain and Sweden. The moment Akzo Nobel uses the materials,
it is booked and invoiced. Just-in-time delivery appeared to be too risky, for
example as a result of trafﬁc. With this system, Akzo Nobel faces less risks,
since the supplier looks after the inventory, the inventory levels, guarantees
availability, and invoices when used, while the same terms for payment apply.
In the case of the Coatings sub-business unit Italy, ﬁnancial overviews
have a uniform format for all areas, including ﬁgures from the previous
quarter and ‘year-to-date’ ﬁgures, comprising budgeted amounts, amounts
of the previous year, and actuals for this year. This overview also gives, for
example, the average net price per liter paint. This way, an internal bench-
mark is created resulting in exceptions to be noticed immediately, for which
the managers are expected to give an explanation. Advantage of this system
is that two ﬂows come together: area operating income, where taxes are
subtracted, and capital (speciﬁcally total working capital: inventory and
accounts receivable with a separation between paid/not to be paid). The
overviews sec are not the result of the implementation of EVA, but the fact
that the amounts on the overviews can now be traced back to details is
speciﬁcally added for EVA purposes.
5.2. Heijmans
Heijmans’ growth targets have for many years been communicated in terms
of turnover and proﬁts, and are therefore the two prime ﬁnancial indicators.
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As a consequence, focus within the organization is on the Proﬁt and Loss
accounts. According to the corporate executives interviewed, another reason
for the remaining focus on P/L is that employees are not held accountable
for EVA, albeit that the calculations are made for each division. This lack of
EVA accountability, the corporate executives think, may be partly due to a
missing link in alignment between value creation and remuneration.
In executing the strategy, Heijmans leaves the divisions and operating
companies full autonomy in using instruments and tools like the Balanced
Scorecard. A division director says: ‘You can see that with EVA in con-
junction with the BSC a few things come together. What counts to reach a
ﬁnal ﬁnancial result are the indicators in the BSC, and those are the key
value drivers. You see the ﬁnancial results by means of the EVA and the
indicators in the BSC jointly developing. This is how the operating com-
panies are managed and it starts to pay off.’ The division director realizes
that EVA is a historical measure, and that is some problem. In his view,
companies therefore need to look at other parameters/measures where EVA
is grounded on. According to the Finance Director, the use of instruments
depend on the people who are in charge and their interests.
Division management tries to pick the best pieces from operational man-
agement to share these with other operating companies. For example, if an
operating company has a good time schedule or system for controlling their
accounts receivable, this is communicated to the other operating companies.
Besides, companies do help each other if they ﬁnd out someone has a
problem. As a division director said: ‘First they laugh with each other if an
operating company has high accounts receivable outstanding, but now it
gradually grows to solve such problems in a joint effort.’
As a result of internal discussions, the assets of the Central Facility
Company (CFC) are not allocated to the divisions/operating companies
effectively using the assets. CFC remains therefore regarded as a sepa-
rate entity with their own EVA responsibility. The rent is expensed on the
operating companies’ proﬁt and loss accounts using the assets, while re-
ported as revenues on CFC’s proﬁt and loss account.
Although the ambitions are present, other priorities (e.g., implementation
of a new company-wide consolidation software package and IFRS) did not
allow corporate management gaining a stronger internal focus on EVA by
means of a uniform outlay for EVA with uniform deﬁnitions. Besides, the
corporate executives expect discussions about the allocated costs from the
Holding to the divisions, and the calculations of the weighted average cost
of capital (WACC). They wonder what value such discussions add to the
application of VBM in the divisions.
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Focusing on EVA/VBM has not been on its name as such, but more on
working capital, an important value driver in the construction industry.
Targets are aimed at underlying value drivers, e.g., invested capital and
accounts receivable outstanding.
5.3. Schiphol
For control purposes Schiphol developed its ‘Diamond.’5 This tool in-
cludes both ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial measures on a fourfold perspectives:
‘Financial,’ ‘Quality,’ ‘Sustainability and Innovation,’ and ‘Employees and
Organization.’
‘Cutting’ the Diamond is based on responsibilities and accountability.
First, the ﬁnancial indicators for the Diamond are determined by the
executive board on corporate level, and subsequently derived to business area
(BA) and business unit (BU) level. The operational indicators in the Diamond
are developed the other way round, starting at the business unit-level. The
business units set their operational indicators and targets, in order to meet the
ﬁnancial targets. The business units’ indicators are based on its operational
departments, with performance indicators like for example occupancy rate in
letting ofﬁce property square meters, revenues of parkings, concessions for
shops in the terminals, and on-time departures of airplanes. The business
units’ Diamonds are subsequently used to build the Diamond on business
area level, and the corporate Diamond. Financial indicators therefore follow
a top-down approach, whereas operational indicators ﬂow bottom-up.
Appendix 3 includes an adapted example of the Diamond.6
On operational level, neither a separate Diamond is implemented, nor
EP/RONA is calculated. As a business unit controller told: ‘due to insufﬁ-
cient controllability on assets, and thus its accountability on the capital
charge.’ These operational departments’ indicators are focused on their
speciﬁc operational activities that are within their control, but are not for-
malized in a management control system. A business unit controller stated
that she ‘does not feel that the management control system should be or-
ganized that way, since these detailed schemes are not used anyway.’ In this
same fashion, she ‘does not consider it to be important to have a value tree,
once you know the business.’ She continued: ‘A project has started to im-
prove Schiphol’s planning and control cycle. In this new cycle, strategy must
qualitatively be improved to make it more activity-directed, where in turn
these activities are translated into the ﬁnancial model, because that is cur-
rently no more than a separate calculus exercise. Subsequently, a clear link
must be established between strategy and budgets.’
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Until 2005, BU Management Teams were held responsible for P/L, al-
though BU directors were also held responsible and accountable for RONA.
This system ascertained that interests at managerial levels were aligned on
creating economic proﬁt, but that managers were held accountable for the
activities they carry responsibility for. Only the BU director could be held
directly accountable for a RONA, while the other members of the manage-
ment teams were only responsible for their part of the BU, was the reasoning.
The consequence of the fact that control was based on two grounds (BAs,
only administrative, without management, and BUs), resulted in a model
that was in place to be used for the ﬁve-year planning, built upon a VBM
analysis, but which was considered to be a black box to everybody, said a
business unit controller. The Schiphol organization was based on processes,
which did not by deﬁnition need to equal how Schiphol approached the
market. Therefore, external and internal control were not aligned. For in-
stance, the terminals are primarily built for passenger transfers, but also
house shops, stores and other concessionaires. Since these activities related
to different PMCs and BAs, allocation (both costs and assets) was a very
complex exercise. As of 2004, however, allocations are effected directly
by the information system (Oracle), which was also required by the NMa.
Since these allocations take place by means of journal entries in the book-
keeping system, it also forced Schiphol to describe clear and transparent
procedures.
To solve the misalignment in control, as of 2005 business units are aban-
doned, and departments are directly linked to business areas, whose entire
management is EP/RONA responsible.
Appendix 4 shows the key control characteristics how these organizations
manage for value.
6. EFFECTS ON BEHAVIOR, DECISION MAKING
AND PERFORMANCE
This section will look into the effects on behavior, decision making and
performance, now these companies manage for value.
6.1. Akzo Nobel
With introducing EVA, Akzo Nobel also introduced a consistent focus
and common language over all business units, compared to a range of
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different measures that were used in the pre-VBM era (e.g., ROI, ROS). As
a consequence, more attention is paid to (working) capital, in order to
achieve ‘proﬁtable growth and sustainable proﬁts.’7
Regarding allocation of resources, the effects are best described in the
2004 annual report (p. 10):
We regularly evaluate the added value of the composition of our portfolio in a pragmatic
way, driven by our value creation principle. As in the past, we will not shy away from
bold moves.
The sub-business unit director experienced that EVA resulted in a higher
awareness for the balance sheet, with the consequence that decisions are
often scrutinized for its effects on the EVA. However, he never saw the
statement again which was called when rolling out EVA, that ‘Capital is
plenty available, but it is expensive.’ In his view, even a good project is hard
to be approved.
In this similar light, the EVA coordinator told that production and site
rationalization also became common practice, especially at the Coatings-
Group where equipment is easy to move. This is also illustrated by one of
the ‘priorities’ that caused the delay in including the EVA calculation in the
regular information system in Italy, where three production sites were added
together to one.
Lately, a couple of units at Akzo have started a pilot by introducing
activity-based costing in conjunction with EVA. To each activity a capital
charge is included, to gain insight in the proﬁtability of products and cus-
tomers. However, at this stage it is more for their own information than that
it is already used in decision making.
6.2. Heijmans
Although Heijmans introduced and adopted EVA, the drive adheres to
growth and grow bigger, where economic value creation is only of secondary
concern. Acquisitions are assessed in terms of payback period, development
in price/earnings ratio, discounted cash ﬂows, Goodwill/Intrinsic Value-
ratio, and debt ratio (equity/debt). Foremost, the division executives told
that the strategic value of the acquisition is probably most important.8
A former corporate controller said: ‘Behavior does not really need to
change, since the companies know very well how to make money.’ He could
imagine that the focus of an entrepreneur would shift from, for example,
proﬁts to working capital, but he stresses that it is certainly not the case that
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the companies are currently doing a bad job, and would only start making
money once managing on EVA. Besides, the former corporate controller
stated that ‘decisions regarding purchasing of equipment are not taken
differently from before EVA was implemented, despite that as a result of
EVA the costs of capital should be taken into account. Awareness is not yet
that deeply rooted in the organization.’ In that view, he added an important
issue that operational management needs to be aware of the fact that the
corporate shareholders also require a return, and that making a proﬁt takes
more than just earning the interest on debt. This is also illustrated by the
fact that operating companies are not very willing and cooperating in sac-
riﬁcing their autonomy, for example in favor of joint purchasing to cut
costs.
It is remarkable, told the business unit director, that technically educated
people who understand EVA are more aimed at ﬁnding solutions and being
more proactive, compared to business-educated people who are more back-
ward looking and can perfectly tell why something went wrong. Or, in his
words: ‘Business-educated people can tell you why a company went bank-
rupt, while technically schooled people try to avoid going bankrupt.’
Since the implementation of EVA in 1997, considerable time and effort
was dedicated to make management aware of EVA and its drivers, said the
Finance Director. However, throughout the years enthusiasm gradually
declined since operational management considered it to be too complicated
and as a consequence did not understand the model. The EVA calculations
often resulted in discussions about the calculations, but not about setting
EVA targets for next year and manage the drivers to realize that target. The
focus remained on proﬁts, and the capital base has not been reduced after
the implementation of EVA.
The IFRS have had an enormous impact in ﬁscal year 2004, and this
seriously delayed further developments in EVA. EVA has not yet been
abandoned, but as a result of other priorities, like for instance the IFRS,
only very little emphasis was put on this system.
The Finance Director is, however, personally inclined to put EVA back on
the corporate agenda, though in a simpliﬁed form, related to management’s
requirements and depicting the system by means of a DuPont-chart. With
EVA, he told, ‘one language is spoken throughout the organization, which
is crucial in having the model accepted.’ Preferably, he feels that this sim-
pliﬁed EVA should also be added to the 2008 targets. If it gets this far,
quarterly reporting on EVA is within reach, contrary to the current situa-
tion of ‘annual calculations without-questions-asked.’
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6.3. Schiphol
At Schiphol, managing for value did not reduce investments, but ‘did
absolutely have an impact on investments, in the sense that motivation and
discussions became much more profound,’ as the corporate controller
stated.
Unfortunately, at lower levels, the old culture of: ‘it has always been
possible, it is still possible, we need it, so let’s buy it!’ had been vivid for
some years after implementation. However, ‘even at levels where one would
not expect it anymore decisions are made which not fully comply with
VBM-principles, because certain aspects are overemphasized that are not
supported by VBM,’ told the former corporate controller. Both the former
corporate controller as well as a business unit controller acknowledge that
this change in culture needed time, certainly since it concerned a change due
to the transition of a public body to a private company, and eventually listed
company.
The cultural change that is effected is attributable to a combination
of factors playing at the same time (e.g., rejuvenated attention for VBM,
organizational restructuring, business process redesign, and a renewal/
rejuvenation of management, who have been given the speciﬁc duty of
effecting a cultural change). The business unit controller stated in this re-
spect that ‘although it cannot be solely attributed to VBM, but it probably
will have helped, is that the organization became more businesslike and
professional in its attitude. It turned into more target driven, more trans-
parent (although still subject for improvement), and results driven.’
In business planning and budgeting neither the system nor periodicity
have changed upon implementing VBM, but the contents of both business
letters and budget letters are now based on VBM. Target setting is based on
VBM, and control is aimed at meeting these (RONA) targets by means of
the Diamond.9
VBM provides management with a complete management system, com-
pared to a more fragmatic system that was used before. This increased view
on management created a better awareness for RONA, and how activities
and decisions have impact on the results. For example, for the Business
Area Aviation it is clear that the focus must be on costs and investments,
while for Consumers the focus is more aimed at the revenues side, like
selling concessions, generate turnover (e.g., from parking fees), penetration
degrees, and that Real Estate should focus on its unique location, and gen-
erate cash by letting the ofﬁce buildings.
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According to a former corporate controller, ‘ﬁnancial performance has
certainly improved due to VBM.’ However, the controller admits this is just
a personal conviction, since ‘it can never be proved because you will never
know how it would have been without VBM.’
The effects are summarized in Appendix 5.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
When comparing the three organizations, some interesting differences ap-
pear. In this concluding section, I will focus on these differences and try to
relate these to the differences in successful application of VBM.
7.1. Reasons
First, when looking at the reasons why these companies implemented VBM,
although all three companies do mention that the capital markets had an
important stake in deciding for managing for value, Akzo Nobel and
Schiphol also considered non-ﬁnancial aspects.
Akzo Nobel, for instance, intended to encourage entrepreneurial behavior
as a result of the high level of autonomy of the business units. Having
employees behave like owners, accomplishes the necessary change in mind-
set. Schiphol, on the other hand, was looking for a single management
system to align internal and external reporting and control, instead of
having different systems providing different information, that was until that
time common practice in the various business units.
7.2. Implementation
With respect to the implementation, differences can, among others, be found
in light of the calculations. Akzo Nobel uses EVA, with a uniform deﬁnition
throughout the organization, and with a limited number of adjustments to
operating proﬁt and capital. Besides, they apply one corporate WACC. In
addition, EVA is directly calculated from the information systems in place.
Heijmans has a corporate deﬁnition, but divisions adjusted this deﬁnition
to their own situation, making ﬁgures incomparable. In addition, WACCs
were initially calculated for each division, taking the different risk proﬁles
into account. However, later it was decided, for reasons of simplicity, that
these different WACCs were replaced with one corporate. Throughout the
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organization, different information systems are in place as a result of the
high number of acquisitions. These systems do not directly provide EVA
information. Albeit that at corporate level the calculations were initially and
intentionally held simple, the system evolved with an increasing complexity
as a result of the fact that the divisions felt they needed to adjust the deﬁ-
nitions to their own situation.
Schiphol followed a similar pattern like Heijmans regarding the WACC.
Initially, the four business areas all had their own cost of capital, but later
one corporate WACC was applied, with the exception of aviation as a result
of legal requirements. Differences between the other BAs seemed to be too
small, that it was decided to release these separate WACCs. As of 2005, due
to the restructuring, the BAs were assigned speciﬁc WACCs again for in-
ternal purposes. Besides, the calculation of RONA/EP is directly linked with
the information system in place.
7.3. Impact on Management Control System
Differences regarding implementation and control also appear in the
extent to which the use of VBM stretches into the organization. At
Akzo Nobel, VBM is a ‘way of life’ for all employees. All employees are
familiar with EVA, although they are only held accountable for aspects they
control. In that view, both ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial measures are used
(e.g., by means of the Balanced Scorecard). Focus is not on managing
EVA, but on how to manage the business to increase EVA (thus, on
value drivers). In order to use EVA as a corporate language, Akzo
Nobel created the position of EVA coordinator as ‘one-stop-shop’ to co-
ordinate communication and initiate supporting tools throughout the or-
ganization. That way, implementation of VBM was streamlined compared
to the initial efforts which resulted in a lack in communication between
the BUs.
At Heijmans, implementation of VBM was also left to the divisions’ man-
agement. However, the divisions were left full autonomy, e.g., in applicability
of tools like the Balanced Scorecard or value trees. No inter-divisional
coordination was at hand. Focus was on working capital, in addition to
turnover and proﬁt, and the extent to which VBM was used is restricted to
higher and middle management. No one was actually held accountable for
EVA performances; it was considered to be nothing more but a calculus
exercise. Recently, operational measures are included in the control of di-
visions, albeit that EVA is not considered in these measures (based on net
proﬁt margin and ROI).
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Schiphol implemented VBM centrally, and only a very limited number of
managers was involved. Due to a legally required restructuring, resulting in
a complex organizational structure with unclear responsibilities, use of
VBM drifted away to a mere calculation for controllers. The Balanced
Scorecard is used to express that managing for value reaches beyond
ﬁnancial metrics. Financial targets/indicators are set top-down in the
organization, while operational targets/indicators are set bottom-up, ensur-
ing they are in conjunction with each other. That way, all members in the
organization are actually involved in and eventually contribute to creating
value. Employees are only held accountable for the activities they control,
which are included in the target setting. To align internal and external con-
trol, business units are abandoned as of 2005, and operational departments
are univocally related to business areas.
7.4. Remuneration
Remuneration is another aspect on which the three companies differ. Akzo
Nobel implemented EVA gradually throughout the organization, allowing
people time to get accustomed to the managing for value principles. Re-
muneration followed a similar path: ﬁrst the link with EVA performance
was restricted to top management, while as of 2003 all Dutch employees
have a link with EVA.
Heijmans had no remuneration policy based on performance, except for
the board of management. However, no link was established with EVA or
value creation.
Schiphol is extending its remuneration policy. Initially, only the Board of
Management and business unit directors were held accountable for RONA/
EP targets, which were subsequently linked to remuneration. As of 2004, the
entire business unit management is held accountable for EP, and as of 2005
business areas, making it more profound that the entire management is
responsible for achieving EP targets. This policy will in the next years be
extended to lower levels.
7.5. Effects on Behavior, Decision Making and Performance
When looking at the effects, Akzo Nobel seems to have achieved the most.
EVA introduced a consistent focus and common language, leading to a
higher capital consciousness and consequently higher awareness for the
balance sheet, e.g., in the effected site rationalizations and allocation of
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resources, although the extent to which this is possible depends on a group’s
activities and legal requirements.10
Noting the executives interviewed, Heijmans achieved probably the least.
EVA is not considered in investment proposals, and discussions often focus
on the calculation rather than the drivers of value. Operational manage-
ment considered EVA to be too complicated, which resulted in a gradually
declining enthusiasm for using EVA. In addition, implementation of the
IFRS also distracted attention of EVA. In the year 2005, the decision will be
made to revitalize EVA, or abandon it.
Schiphol stands in between. After a good start, applying VBM in,
for instance, investment proposals and introducing the Diamond to link
non-ﬁnancial measures (and lower-level employees) to value creation, the
legal requirement of changing the organizational structure resulted in a
hazy structure of responsibilities. Control was aimed at business units,
while the business areas were the entities to create value, although these
business areas were not formally managed. With the revitalization in 2003,
as a result of the business process redesign to bridge the gap between
business areas and business units, VBM again provides management
with a complete management system, compared to the fragmental view as
previously was the case. The effects of the 2005 abandoning of BUs are
not clear yet, albeit that awareness grew of how activities and decisions
have impact on RONA/EP in order to focus attention in managing the
business.
Based on the cases described in this paper, it can be concluded that in
applying an effective and efﬁcient VBM system, the management control
system needs alignment in setting targets, rewards and communication with
value drivers, avoiding too much focus on VBM-calculations. The cases also
show that VBM is not a style by itself, but comprises different tools to make
it a system. In the case of Akzo Nobel, this is clearly illustrated by enhancing
an entrepreneurial spirit. Employees are held accountable for the activities
they control (e.g., using the Balanced Scorecard), they are encouraged to
look forward by means of using rolling forecasts, and they are rewarded for
achieving targets, all based on the drivers behind EVA as common nom-
inator (using a value tree). Heijmans, on the other hand, still holds a stra-
tegic focus on traditional measures like turnover and proﬁt, not holding
people accountable for EVA. Focus is on working capital, as most impor-
tant driver, but other drivers are basically neglected. Higher management
admits that EVA never really gained foothold in the organization. For that
reason, VBM can be considered to have failed. Schiphol, eventually, is with
its revitalization of VBM back on track of making its management control
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system ‘compatible’ with VBM, rather than manage for value without
adapting the organization and control system, thus making the two ‘not
compatible.’
These cases provide some characteristics of how companies differ in im-
plementing and applying VBM, and how they (failed to) adapt their man-
agement control system. Future research could be aimed at a more extensive
sample of companies that manage for value, in order to conﬁrm the ﬁndings
from this study, since observations from three cases can by no means be
generalized. Besides, another interesting subject to extend research to is how
the entire supply chain can be involved in creating value on a larger scale,
since current research is restricted to ‘within-ﬁrm’ capital-awareness and
proﬁt and loss account/balance sheet improvements.
NOTES
1. A ‘value tree’ is a system to depict the variables of economic proﬁt into new
variables that have impact on the former variable. It is comparable with the ‘Dupont
chart’ for ROI. This way the variables can be broken down to the lowest level in the
organization and can include both ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial variables. Rappaport
(1998) speaks about ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ value drivers for referring to generic and
operational value drivers.
2. AirportCity is a registered trademark by Schiphol Group.
3. Until today, the Dutch government still has not decided about a date for the
privatization.
4. Heijmans won several awards for the strength of its investor relations policy,
including the Sijthoff Award for its annual reports for 1996 and 2001. In 2003
Heijmans was awarded the Rematch Investor Relations Award in the AMX-stocks
(Midkap) category.
5. The Diamond is, as of January 1, 2005, renamed to Balanced Scorecard.
6. Adapted in the sense that three separate Diamonds are aggregated to a single
one, for comparative purposes.
7. However, a reduction in working capital is for a Group like Pharma hard to
accomplish. The EVA coordinator told: ‘First, this group is still very sales oriented,
meaning that they accept high inventories to fulﬁll orders. Second, the cost of capital
is too low compared to their returns. Their after-tax return is about 25%. Compared
to a WACC of 9% this is very high, and as such the WACC provides less incentives
to save on working capital than the fear of losing sales from out-of-stock situation,
even though both drivers could be perfectly combined. Third, which is probably
most evident, is that this industry is highly regulated. They cannot easily change their
working environment, since everything (like e.g., the general manufacturing proc-
esses and general purchasing processes) is subject to strict guidelines. New produc-
tion facilities/equipment and workﬂows are scrutinized by the US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), and for that reason it gives less opportunities to bring down
inventories or working capital in general.’
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8. The strategic value is a verbal essay that explains what the acquisition adds to
the activity portfolio of a division.
9. See previous section on ‘Value-based Management and the Management
Control System.’
10. For example, Pharma is subject to requirements of the US Food and Drug
Administration regarding production of pharmaceuticals.
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APPENDIX 1. REASONS FOR IMPLEMENTING
VALUE-BASED MANAGEMENT
Akzo Nobel  Pressure from capital markets
 Encourage entrepreneurial behavior
 Lagging share price compared to index
Heijmans  Communication with stock market
 Attention for working capital
 Pressure from capital markets
Schiphol  Decentralization and target setting
 Privatization and consequent attention for shareholders’ return
 Desire for a single management system
 Legal requirements by Dutch Competition Authority
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APPENDIX 2. IMPLEMENTATION OF VALUE-BASED
MANAGEMENT
Company (Year of Effective
Implementation; Metric)
Characteristics
Akzo Nobel (2000; EVA – corporate
WACC, about 4 adjustments)
 1998: attention for capital
 Jan 1, 2000: half-year pilot in one BU at
each of three Groups
 Jan 1, 2001: EVA up and running in all
BUs
 Training: 700–800 top managers
 Objectives: change in mindset, create
awareness for WACC, explain
techniques (only ﬁnancial management)
 Initially: lack of communication between
BUs as result of high level of autonomy
 Due course 2001: introduction EVA
coordinator
 Supported by: Brochures, Intranet, EVA
drivers game, value-seminars
 Link with remuneration (initially senior
management, as of 2003 all Dutch
employees)
 Focus: not EVA, but value drivers
 ‘EVA-award’ for employee with most
appealing EVA idea
Heijmans (1997; EVA – initially WACC
per division, later corporate WACC,
about 3 adjustments)
 Many acquisitions in 1996 – attention for
capital
 Company-wide implementation in 1997
 High level of decentralization; rolling out
EVA to lower levels divisions’
responsibility
 Initially speciﬁc training higher
management; as of 2000 incorporated in
various training programs
 ‘EVA not an aim, but a means’ – mindset
instead of calculation
 No company-wide ERP system to
calculate EVA, to avoid impression that
holding is ‘owner’ of EVA; nevertheless
EVA seen as calculus-exercise
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 Corporate EVA deﬁnition, but divisions
apply own deﬁnitions; no EVA below
division-level
 No link with remuneration
Schiphol (1999; RONA/EP – initially
WACC per business area, later
corporate WACC, 2005: BA-speciﬁc
WACC for internal purposes, no
adjustments)
 Preliminary project to look into VBM
concluded in 1998
 Workshops with BU management to trace
value drivers and develop value tree
(with external consultants)
 Company-wide implementation in 1999
 VBM as business tool rather than ‘a
calculation’
 No formal training, except for
management game (only for
management)
 VBM used in holistic way
 As of 2000 attention for VBM drifted
away due to complex organizational
structure – EP only used by corporate
controllers
 In 2003 revitalization RONA/EP as result
of BPR to bridge gap between BA and
BU and renewed discussion about IPOa
 Remuneration based on VBM-targets for
Board of Management and BU
management
 No supportive materials provided; only
discussed during courses (2005),
sessions, management presentations,
and ‘conversations with the Board of
Management’ in case of lower
management.
aOn July 2, 2004, the Dutch government decided to sell a minority stake in the Schiphol group
at a ﬁnancially opportune time as long as public interest is adequately protected.
APPENDIX 2. (Continued )
Company (Year of Effective
Implementation; Metric)
Characteristics
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APPENDIX 3. ADAPTED DIAMOND FOR
SCHIPHOL GROUP
Diamonds Group, BA
and BU level
Schiphol Group Business Area
Consumers
Business Unit
Passengers
Financial
Primary revenues
Revenues Revenues Revenues
Expenses Expenses Expenses
EBITDA EBITDA
Operating result Operating result Operating result
Net result
Average Fixed Assets Average Fixed Assets Average Fixed Assets
RONA after tax RONA after tax RONA after tax
WACC WACC
Economic Proﬁt Economic Proﬁt
Shareholders’ equity
Total Assets
Development revenues
(%)
Development
revenues (%)
Development expenses
(%)
Development
expenses (%)
(STB ¼ Security duties
civil aviation)
Development revenues
excl. STB
Development expenses
excl. STB
Interest Coverage Ratio
ROE
Leverage Book Value
Change in Working
Capital
Change in Working
Capital
Cash Flow from
Operations
Cash Flow from
Investments
Cash ﬂow from
Investments
CF from Inv. Tangible
Fixed Assets
(WLU ¼Workload unit) Costs per WLU BA
Aviation
Costs per WLU BA
Aviation excl. STB
(SBF ¼ See Buy Fly) Concession SBF per IDP Concession SBF per
IDP
(IDP ¼ Int’l Departing
Passenger)
Parking per OD PAX
(A/R ¼ Accounts
Receivable)
Average A/R days
outstanding
% accounts receivable
4 60 days
% accounts payable
4 60 days
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Quality
Passengers (including
transfer)
Passengers (including
transfer)
Capacity leases
(OD ¼ Origin
Destination)
Departing OD passengers Departing OD
passengers
Availability ﬂow
installations
terminal
Departing Transfer
passengers
Departing Transfer
passengers
Flowspace Schengen
Airplane movements Flowspace
Non-Schengen
(MTOW ¼Max
Take-off Weight)
Average MTOW
Cargo
(pax ¼ passengers) Mainport destination pax
Mainport destination
cargo
Market share passengers
Euro Top 5
Market share cargo Euro
Top 5
Arrivals punctuality
Departures punctuality
(IR ¼ Irregularity Rate) Bagage IR rate Bagage IR rate
(CISS ¼ Central Info
Syst Schiphol)
Availability CISS Oper. Availability
bagage Central
Satisfaction PAX airlines
& handlers
Oper. Avail. bagage
Mainlines D-pier
Satisfaction arriving
passengers
Satisfaction arriving
passengers
Satisfaction arriving
passengers
Satisfaction departing
passengers
Satisfaction departing
passengers
Satisfaction departing
passengers
Price/Quality ratio SBF Price/Quality ratio
SBF
Buying penetration SBF Buying penetration
SBF
Shopping space per
IDP
Price/Quality hotel/
catering
Satisfaction #
facilities waiting
Price/Quality parking Price/Quality parking
Max. capacity utilization
short parking
Max. capacity
utilization short
parking
Max. capacity utilization
long parking
Max. capacity
utilization long
parking
APPENDIX 3. (Continued )
Diamonds Group, BA
and BU level
Schiphol Group Business Area
Consumers
Business Unit
Passengers
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(SRE ¼ Schiphol Real
Estate)
Customer satisfaction
lessees SRE
SRE occupancy rate total
(VVO ¼ ﬂoor area for
rent)
SRE VVO total
Clientcontact CCC in
time
(NS ¼ Dutch Railways) Pass. satisf’n waiting
time ﬁlter NS-S
(S ¼ Schiphol) Pass. satisf’n waiting
time ﬁlter S-NS
Sustainability &
Innovation
(Lden ¼ Level day-
evening-night)
Critical enforcement
issues Lden
(Lnight ¼ Level night) Critical enforcement
issues Lnight
Personal safety
perception
Personal safety
perception
Development new
products
Development new
products
Development new
products
Employees &
Organization
FTEs location Schiphol FTEs
Salaries and social
security charges
Salaries and social
security charges
Outsourcing+ext.
charges+consulting
Outsourcing+ext.
charges+consulting
Employee satisfaction Employee satisfaction
Annual evaluations Annual evaluations
Individual Development
Plan (IOP)
Individual
Development Plan
(IOP)
Absenteeism through
illness
Absenteeism through
illness
Note: NB with the restructuring of 2005, i.e., abandoning business units, BU indicators are
included on BA level.
APPENDIX 3. (Continued )
Diamonds Group, BA
and BU level
Schiphol Group Business Area
Consumers
Business Unit
Passengers
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APPENDIX 4. CHARACTERISTICS OF VALUE-BASED
MANAGEMENT AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL
SYSTEM
Akzo Nobel  Targets in EVA growth
 BU apply quarterly rolling forecasts, 3 quarters ahead + 3-year
strategic plan in October
 Reporting focused on EVA, but supplemented with other ratios
 Active management of product portfolio – if necessary divesting
 Accountability and controllability to low levels
 Investment proposals above EUR 80.000 subject to ‘Project EVAluator
tool’ – positive EVA required, unless HSEa is involved
 Both ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial performance indicators
 Increasing use of ‘Consignment Stocks’
 International deﬁnitions of EVA-related terms
 Better detailed ﬁnancial overviews to trace back amounts
 Allocation keys for indirect costs straightforward, but good insight into
cost management
Heijmans  Turnover and proﬁt two key ﬁnancial indicators
 Management and employees not held accountable for EVA
 No link between EVA and remuneration
 Control focused on ‘working capital’ (components) instead of ‘EVA’
 Divisions full autonomy in applying instruments like BSC for executing
strategy
Schiphol  Diamond – including ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial measures on four
perspectives
 Indicators and control related to responsibility, accountability, and
controllability
 Financial indicators top-down, operational indicators bottom-up
 Quarterly forecasting, 1-year operational plan in Fall, 5-year business
plan (including investments) in Spring
 BU RONA responsible, but P/L driven, budgets based on cost control
 Until 2005 external and internal control not aligned due to difference
between BA (reported in annual report) and BU (internal
organization, based on processes)
 As of 2005: BAs run by management, BUs abandoned
 High number of internal and external interests to meet, as result of
organizational social responsibility, makes control complex
aHSE: Health, Safety and Environment.
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APPENDIX 5. EFFECTS OF VALUE-BASED
MANAGEMENT
Akzo Nobel  Consistent focus and common language
 More attention to working capital
 Employees more entrepreneurial
 Capital consciousness and mindset changed
 Working capital reduced – not always equally easy as result of Group-
industry’s characteristics
 Allocation of resources beneﬁcially for better EVA performers
 Higher awareness Balance sheet, investment proposals harder accepted
 Production and Site rationalization common practice, although depending
on Group’s activities
 Pilot started in few BUs to introduce ABC in conjunction with EVA
Heijmans  Investment proposals based on DCF, EPS and Payback period; not EVA
 Frequent discussions on technical aspects EVA, instead of EVA targets
and manage drivers
 Changing focus from Proﬁt to Capital took longer than expected
 People take more initiatives and act more proactively
 Operational management considers EVA to be too complicated, resulting
in gradually declining enthusiasm
 Despite attention EVA in annual reports, it never gained foothold in
managing
 2005: New CEO set strategic targets in terms of net proﬁt margin and ROI
 Operational measures are included in control of divisions; divisions are
managed more tightly and uniform by responsible member of
Managing Board
 Implementation of IFRS distracted attention from EVA
Schiphol  Discussions about investments in business planning and budgeting more
profound
 Cultural change (from public body to private company) took time, but
organization is becoming more businesslike and professional in attitude
 Decisions are not always made in full compliance with VBM principles
 Acquisitions of airports have been rejected as a result of VBM principles
(RONA)
 VBM provides management with a complete management system,
compared to fragmental previously
 Costs became more transparent and comparable between BUs
 Greater awareness of how activities and decisions have impact on RONA/
EP in order to focus attention
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